Introduction
The assumption, common some years ago, that Western liberal democracies had solved the problem of the relationship between state and religion, with constitutional secularism as a main plank of the solution, 1 now seems somewhat naïve and precipitous, akin to confident declarations of the "end of history." 2 Similarly, the days when the relationship between human rights law and religion was a quiet backwater, appearing to confirm arguments about the end of religion as a serious force in the world, are long gone. Increasingly, conservative religious groups have culture wars are conducted in courts, using human rights law. 9 The role that advocacy networks and NGOs play as translators, or norm entrepreneurs, in debates about freedom of religion in the modern world is my particular focus, but this has implications for debates about the diffusion and socializing of human rights norms more generally.
This article identifies two separate, but closely related, phenomena in litigation with a religious dimension: the increased presence of NGOs in such litigation in their own jurisdictions;
and their increased presence in transnational religious litigation. Many of the same protagonists, (unsurprisingly) may end up on different sides of the domestic and international political and legal divide. Any assumption that NGOs will necessarily adopt "liberal" or "progressive" political orientations seems increasingly questionable. As Bob has observed: "most global issues involve not just a single 'progressive' movement promoting a cause, but also rivals fighting it."
11 "Global civil society," he continues, "is not a harmonious field of like-minded NGOs. It is a contentious arena riven by fundamental differences crisscrossing national and international boundaries." 12 The further assumption that transnational civil actors will share the same or similar preferences to local NGOs will be shown to be equally questionable. The assumption that transnationalization is "a positively enabling process" for local civil society actors, or that "transnational network structures are predominantly seen as benefiting the goals and activities of domestic, civil society norm entrepreneurs" 13 should be taken with a considerable pinch of salt.
As Stachursky suggests, "domestic civil society actors employing transnational human rights discourses, and linguistic repertoires . . . might easily participate in transnational dialogue but face opposition and suspicion by other local civil society actors or their local constituencies."
14 Sally Engle Merry has described how Intermediaries such as NGO and social movement activists play a critical role in interpreting the cultural world of transnational modernity for local claimants. They appropriate, translate, and remake transnational discourses into the vernacular. At the same time, they take local stories and frame them in national and international human rights language. 15 There is, however, a potentially difficult relationship between the different social actors who may have very different understandings of how best (or whether) to translate the vernacular into the international, and the international into the vernacular, because these actors may have different sources of legitimacy that will be differently affected.
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11 BOB, supra note 3, at 2. 12 Id. at 6. 13 The article identifies, finally, how NGOs not only use interventions in domestic and foreign courts to attempt to embed particular models of religious rights; they do so in part through arguments based on comparative reasoning. Those who invoke "foreign" norms infuse their own meaning into these norms. 17 We shall see that there appears to have been an increase in interventions by religious rights' organizations using comparative reasoning in two ways: first, in other countries' courts using comparative arguments drawn from their own countries, and second, by organizations intervening in their own countries' courts, using comparative arguments drawn from other countries. The article identifies a symbiotic relationship between the phenomena of NGO participation in religious litigation at home and abroad, and the use of comparative arguments in that litigation. The elements of globalization and catch-up have combined to encourage the use by religiously affiliated NGOs of foreign legal materials in litigation. The game of catch-up has involved not only catching up in playing the domestic litigation game in the first place, but also catching up in how to play it. However unlikely it might have seemed some years ago, the greater involvement of NGOs on both sides of transnational litigation may be leading to the routinization of the use of comparative jurisprudence, at least in the context of religious litigation, even in the United States.
NGOs and the development of human rights
In their path-breaking work, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink defined networks as "forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange." 18 One form of network they particularly emphasized was what they described as "transnational advocacy networks," which they identified as including "those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services." NGOs, defined by Benjamin Some are local, while others are transnational. Some are "conservative" in their approach to issues of law and religion, while others are "liberal" (terms that will require some further explanation subsequently). Some are specialist NGOs, meaning that they concentrate on issues of law and religion to the exclusion of other human rights issues, while others are generalist, viewing law and religion issues as only part (and possibly a relatively minor part) of the menu of issues with which they engage. Some are established on an ad hoc basis, simply focusing on the particular case or issue before the court with no aim to be involved in the longer term, while others have been involved in human rights issues for some considerable time. 
NGOs and transnational religious litigation
Thus far, we have focused attention on the involvement of NGOs primarily based in the jurisdictions concerned. This pattern is now undergoing significant change, in two respects. First, NGOs based in one jurisdiction, and seeing themselves as primarily interested in issues within that jurisdiction, are nevertheless increasingly intervening in jurisdictions other than their own. Defending Freedom (ADF), which had each been given leave to intervene in the written procedure.
Advantages of NGO participation
In several of these examples, the preferred method of involvement chosen by the NGO was to submit its views to the domestic or regional court in the form of an amicus brief (in the United States cases) or as an intervener (in the United Kingdom and the ECtHR). There are clear advantages for NGOs, and for the courts themselves, in making interventions in this way.
For NGOs, it is a relatively 55 cheap method of demonstrating to their audience and supporters their continuing engagement at the cutting edge of legal debates. To the extent that NGOs are involved in high profile cases, they are likely to be able to generate press interest about their role and that results in publicity and additional funding. NGO participation in litigation is not 51 necessarily based on a short-term desire to win, therefore; being seen to take part is often an advantage in itself, 56 quite apart from any longer term strategic games that they may be playing. 57 NGOs calculate that intervening in this way also means that they are more likely to ensure that their views will find their way to the judges and have some greater prospect of influencing the judge than activity on the margins of the litigation would have. Particularly where judges are burdened with a heavy case load (the ECtHR is the obvious example) and the prospects of judges reading material that is not directly before the court therefore seems slim, such interventions are likely to appear the best (sometimes the only) way of influencing the court.
Nevertheless, for the courts too, there are also potential advantages, 58 if the process of NGO involvement is handled carefully. 59 Human rights cases frequently involve profoundly difficult questions of fact and law, morality, and politics, often in circumstances in which the court is confronted with the issues for the first time. 60 For courts that draw on ideas of regional or international consensus to interpret human rights norms, interveners may help the court identify whether such a consensus exists, and provide information of legal approaches adopted in other legal systems. 61 Particularly in litigation before regional courts and international bodies, the case will arise in one political, cultural, and religious setting, which may be quite different elsewhere.
The pleadings submitted by the parties may give no real insight concerning the case's implications for other countries. Ideally, NGOs can help to prompt the court to appreciate a broader range of considerations that the case involves than the parties themselves may be able or willing to provide. NGO involvement can also bring to the court specialized expertise on particular issues to help resolve the issues before the court. And, finally, the court may consider that NGOs provide a greater degree of "popular" participation in the litigation than if they were 56 See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 55, at 318-20. 57 Rather than seeing this conservative movement as homogeneous, it is more accurate to view the networks of "lawyers from the right" as a loose coalition comprising: religious and social conservatives --particularly interested in opposing social change in areas such as abortion and gay rights --; libertarians and affirmative action opponents particularly interested in reducing 68 Even within each of these broad policy orientations (such as that comprising "religious organizations") there are also significant differences. As the number of such groups has increased, and as "their leaders struggled to compete in the market for patrons, credit, and influence," 74 groups have attempted to identify how they differ from other groups in terms of the subject areas on which they focus and the strategies and tactics they use. Thus, within the broad area of conservative religious organizations, some focus on opposing pornography while others advocate home schooling; some will be primarily Catholic and others will be Evangelical
Christians; some will target Congress while others focus on the courts. The most prominent groups that have focused significantly on the courts include the Alliance Defense Fund, the these groups will be included as NGOs, although several may strenuously object to be so designated.
In the United States, the involvement of NGOs in religious litigation appears to be growing, partly because the number of NGOs is growing and each needs to set itself apart from the others in a crowded field. Involvement in litigation may be a useful way of doing so. The growing involvement of such NGOs also has much to do with the growing centrality of American courts in deciding hot-button issues in American political life, particularly those that involve contested issues of the relationship between law and morals. The United States has for some time been experiencing increasingly bitter political standoffs between "liberal" and "conservative" political forces, and this has been particularly evident in controversies on issues such as abortion, samesex marriage, healthcare, gun control, capital punishment, affirmative action, the treatment of immigrants, the issue of torture in the interrogation of suspected terrorists, and the role of religion in public life, to name but a few of the more contentious issues. All of these issues have ended up before the federal judiciary. 77 
See Deena R Hurwitz, Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of International Human Rights Clinics, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 505 (2003).
Those involved in intervening in religious litigation differ ideologically, organizationally, and strategically and they largely proceed independently in the actions they pursued. Although they differ, NGOs that are involved primarily on one of these issues, taking a conservative position on abortion, say, identify NGOs that take a "conservative" position on other issues in this list (say, health care) as potential allies. We see a broad coalition of "conservative" groups coalescing around an issue that at first sight seems far from the concerns of some members of the group (say, an anti-abortion group and an anti-gun control group both filing amicus briefs opposing same-sex marriage). This development is not confined to the conservative side of the political divide, with the same phenomenon occurring among "liberal" groups, and seems to be a In light of this discussion, the broad-brush distinction drawn above between "liberal" and "conservative" is not a particularly well chosen, and may well be misleading if the characterization is thought to indicate that interventions are intended to pursue a Republican or Democratic political agenda. It is, unfortunately, almost impossible not to use the liberal/conservative distinction, given how pervasive it is in current American political discourse, but many of those who advocate for religious freedom issues do not think they are pursuing a "conservative" agenda. They view themselves as pro-religious freedom, and pro-human rights in general. A better characterization, perhaps, is to view the controversies as ones within constitutional and human rights law, arising from the clash of human rights, especially the clash between freedom of religion, association and speech on the one hand (attracting "conservative" support), and non-discrimination, equality or personal autonomy norms on the other (attracting "liberal" support). In the context of this article, therefore, the terms "conservative" and "liberal" have specialized meanings, indicating broadly different orientations on which rights should have priority, and how particular rights should be interpreted.
US religious groups and transnational litigation in Europe
Although they share a broad set of common values, in several respects US conservative religious groups have developed tactics that diverge from other conservative groups. 
US religious groups and transnational litigation beyond Europe
Interventions by transnational NGOs have, so far, been relatively uncontroversial in the European context. Where such interventions occur outside Europe, however, this has proven more controversial, because it has raised accusations of neo-colonialism that feature much less prominently in the European context. A common pattern of NGO involvement appears to be evolving. Initially, local progressive groups become involved in a particular jurisdiction to reform an aspect of domestic policy or practice, often using the local courts as part of their reform strategy. These efforts are frequently supported by arguments drawing on international law and precedents from other jurisdictions, as well as material and other support from progressive human rights groups outside the jurisdiction. This, in turn, results in those opposing these changes arguing that those advocating change are not only wrong in principle, but that such changes only come about as a result of objectionable outside interference.
The current controversy surrounding the criminalization of sodomy is a prime example.
Although not entirely restricted to states with a history of British colonial rule, these states have proven particularly attracted to criminalization. 107 At least since the decision of the ECtHR in Dudgeon, 108 attempting to have such crimes struck down has become an important aspect of the work of groups campaigning in favor of gay rights, often using international law to argue that such legislation is illegitimate. 109 A good example of this is the successful campaign to ensure that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights would decide that criminalization was contrary to the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. 110 This case attracted interventions from influential lawyers drawing on European human rights law, 111 which the Inter-American Court largely adopted. In India, a similar strategy also led initially to a successful outcome for gay rights campaigners, with the Delhi High Court holding that criminalizing sodomy was contrary to the Indian Constitution, 112 only to see that judgment itself overturned by the Indian Supreme Court. 113 These actions have, however, led to a counter-reaction, based partly on opposition to change on the basis of principle, but also objecting to what local conservative groups have characterized as a transnational attempt to undermine domestic decisions on issues of morality that are more appropriately left to national decision-making processes. We thus see in several countries attempts to restrict the activities of NGOs, particular foreign-based NGOs, operating in this field.
It is unclear how much such developments are part of larger anti-foreign pressures --legislation aimed at limiting the influence of civil society organizations or restricting foreign funding of non-commercial organizations is evident in several places for reasons that seem unconnected to the types of religious controversies we are concerned with in this article. 114 The while accepting that Alliance Defending Freedom has provided advice, legal assistance and strategy.
US religious groups and the use of international and foreign law in US courts
As well as distinguishing themselves from other US conservative groups by engaging in transnational litigation in Europe and the developing world, US religious groups are also beginning, however tentatively, to take advantage of their position as emerging transnational 121 religious conservative "norm entrepreneurs," 124 by feeding particular interpretations of international and foreign law back into the American courts.
To those who observe NGOs' role in litigation in other countries, this is hardly surprising.
The supply of comparative arguments by such interveners appears to be a primary method in which the courts receive such information. 125 This is significantly on the increase, taking advantage of (or, as we have seen, sometimes creating) procedure in different courts that allow for interveners or amicus curiae arguments to be presented to appellate courts. The increased use of such arguments in the ECtHR, for example, dates from the changes in the Court's rules of procedure in the early 1980s, which permitted interventions.
One of the ways in which these actors make themselves particularly useful to such courts is by bringing an explicitly comparative approach to bear in their arguments. Indeed, one of the main roles of NGOs is to provide comparative argumentation, 126 and it is thus not surprising that US conservative religious groups have done the same when intervening in these foreign courts. drawing extensively on comparative and international law. 144 On the other side, against the employer, was an amicus brief by Lawrence Gostin of Georgetown University Law Centre and four other legal academics also drawing on international and comparative law. 145 Religious groups that otherwise follow a broad conservative political agenda in other respects are, therefore, willing to break ranks on the use of international and comparative law, confirming that the "conservative" movement is much less monolithic than it might appear to be.
Southworth has identified a clear difference within "conservative" understandings of legal interpretation, contrasting conservatives "who emphasize national sovereignty and democratic accountability," 146 with those from a conservative religious perspective who draw on a natural law and natural rights approach. For the latter, developments in other legal systems could and should be drawn on as a manifestation of practical reason playing out in ways that are relevant to US judicial decision-making. She quotes the Becket Fund, for example, as asserting that religious freedom is "a basic human right that no government may lawfully deny; it is not a gift of the state, but instead is rooted in the inherent dignity of the human person." 147 Such a position is more sympathetic to arguments drawn from international human rights law.
The human rights story that is being told, however, is an increasingly complicated one in this respect. In both the ECtHR and the United States Supreme Court, we can observe a somewhat similar development in the citation of international and comparative law in religious litigationresort to such sources is increasingly occurring on both sides of contested issues, with each side attempting to contest the other's efforts. Indeed, at the level of the contending parties and their supporters, it is becoming usual to attempt to head off the use of such sources by the other side.
In Ladele, 148 for example, extensive arguments were made on both sides on how to interpret the comparative material on conscientious objection. So too, in Perry, detailed briefs on the issue of foreign law were submitted in support of both sides. One brief pointing to "the international trend towards equal marriage rights for same-sex couples" was filed by a transnational coalition composing the International Center for Advocates Against Discrimination (based in the United States), Liberty (in the UK), the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (in Canada), the Legal A second brief, by Professors Harold Koh, Sarah Cleveland, Laurence Helfer and Ryan Goodman, also argued that there was an increasing trend towards the recognition of same sex marriage. The latter was developed as a direct result and in response to the international and comparative arguments first submitted by the petitioners and several NGOs supporting them. 149 Indeed, there seems to be a strategy emerging in these cases which views the absence of an argument based on these materials as more potentially dangerous than the presence of such arguments, because it may indicate to the Court that the use of such materials by the other side cannot be rebutted. We are now in the interesting situation where the use of such materials may be becoming "normalized" to a degree that would have seemed surprising (at least in the United States) even a decade ago. International and comparative norm internalization by way of emulation appears to be operating at least at the level of the parties, even if no equivalent development has emerged at the level of the court. Indeed, this strategy may be adopted not in order to persuade the respective court that the preferred interpretation of these materials should be adopted by the court, but as a spoiler of what the other side has presented. Success may be measured by stopping the court from citing the other side's use of this material. If so, then in both Ladele, 150 Hollingsworth, 151 and Hobby Lobby, 152 this spoiler tactic worked; it is noticeable that despite the extensive set of arguments based on international and comparative materials on both sides in these cases, the relevant Court did not advert to these arguments in either case, thus supporting Bob's suggestion that one of the outcomes of (and sometimes the intention behind) such clashes between ideological rivals is non-policy making. 
Some normative implications
The aim of this article has been to produce a thick description rather than a normative analysis, but it is legitimate to ask how far NGO interventions of the type we have been considering are acceptable on normative grounds. On one reading, the separate elements of this phenomenon (NGOs actively involved beyond the borders of the state in which they are situated; NGOs engaging in litigation; religious issues raising human rights questions; conservative groups adopting the tactics of liberals), even when taken together, raise no new normative issues. These groups have simply combined together already existing elements, each of which is broadly legitimate, to produce the phenomenon described. The phenomenon is no more than the sum of its parts, and no more normatively problematic that each of its parts taken separately. Those who object to such NGO interventions are likely to be driven by similar ideological objections as have been raised about international human rights in general, such as an objection based on the prime importance of retaining national sovereignty. Such arguments are increasingly heard from both the left and the right of the political spectrum. This normative position is then simply applied to the phenomenon described, and we can assess the validity of the argument in that context in the same way as we assess its validity in the other contexts in which it arises. There is nothing new.
There is, however, an alternative reading, in which bringing together these elements into the phenomenon described does, indeed, raise additional normative issues that go beyond existing debates. Just as the confluence of different streams into a river may produce something of a different character to the streams taken separately, so too (goes the argument), taken together these separate strands amount to more than the sum of their parts and are normatively problematic in this form. How, more precisely, might this phenomenon gives rise to new normative issues?
We have seen that interventions by NGOs have sometimes led to European courts (combining European domestic and European regional courts together, for the moment) adapting themselves institutionally and becoming more like the "public law" litigation forums beloved of liberals and reformers in the heyday of pubic interest litigation in the United States. Such institutional changes are undoubtedly likely to lead to significant changes in the power dynamics that currently exist between national governments and the courts. There is, however, little prospect that such external interventions will significantly destabilize the dominant pluralistic view of the relationship between religion and the state, and they have not in fact done so. In the European context, the effect of such interventions as those described are likely to affect human rights developments only at the margins, and primarily at the level of institutional power relationships. The normative questions engaged relate primarily to the desirability of the shifts in power relations. The fact that they arise from outside the state itself does bring a new element into that debate, but it is unlikely to generate much angst because the external interventions fall clearly within the parameters of internal domestic debates on these issues. And we have seen that, in fact, these interventions have generated little controversy.
Were What might be done about this is another matter, however, and the approach adopted must blend arguments of principle and prudence. I suggest that we should think of foreign NGO involvement in litigation within the paradigms of freedom of speech and freedom of association.
This would lead to several possible strands of argument, many of which would support the NGOs freedom to intervene, but some of which might also lead to restrictions on such involvement. Thus, for example, if we think of the issue of human rights interventions before courts as one closely approximating the issue of political lobbying, we might support some restrictions. We are sometimes willing to support restrictions on freedom of association because we are suspicious of well-financed interest groups dominating the political process and driving out poorer groups, hence the regulation of campaign financing. We might think of the phenomenon described in this article as closely akin to foreign lobbying of the political process and be willing to consider introducing regulatory constraints similar to those applying in that context. Increasingly, states have been concerned at foreign-dominated political lobbying and have introduced transparency requirements, such as a requirement to register, declare foreign involvement, and disclose sources of funding. At the moment, few, if any of these types of requirements apply to foreign "lobbying" in the judicial process, but should they?
At one level, it is hard to resist calls for greater transparency or limiting the role in courts of foreign organizations that have simply bought such access, but the problem is that, in some circumstances, requiring transparency or limiting the role of foreign financial subventions will act as a severe disincentive to groups participating in judicial intervention to support preferred values. Requiring pro-democracy groups to disclose that they are partly funded by foreign government sources, for example, could have severe consequences for those involved with such groups, including in some countries the threat of violence and death. 154 These restrictions will surely be used by repressive regimes to justify their own attempts to suppress dissent.
What we seem to be left with, to return to the free speech analogy, is a normative conclusion that encourages more speech rather than restricting existing speech. Those concerned with foreign NGO involvement, whether in Europe or elsewhere, and whether of the left or the right, should seek to counter their influence, if they object to their involvement, by ensuring that they are at least aware that such activity is occurring (and in that context it is surprising that this article is, so far as I am aware, the first in the legal literature to map the extent of this practice), and ensuring that an equally well-funded voice is present on each occasion that can respond with sophistication and authority to such interventions. 154 Analogous to Southern states in the US requiring civil rights groups, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), to register and disclose membership lists as a way of suppressing their activities, a tactic subsequently struck down by the US Supreme Court, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
